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of Adolf Hitler
Abstract
The enormous Nazi voting literature rarely builds on modern statistical or economic research. By adding
these approaches, we find that the most widely accepted existing theories of this era cannot distinguish
the Weimar elections from almost any others in any country. Via a retrospective voting account, we
show that voters most hurt by the depression, and most likely to oppose the government, fall into
separate groups with divergent interests. This explains why some turned to the Nazis and others turned
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The enormous Nazi voting literature rarely builds on modern statistical or  
economic research. By adding these approaches, we find that the most widely 
accepted existing theories of this era cannot distinguish the Weimar elections 
from almost any others in any country. Via a retrospective voting account, we 
show that voters most hurt by the depression, and most likely to oppose the  
government, fall into separate groups with divergent interests. This explains why 
some turned to the Nazis and others turned away. The consequences of Hitler’s 
election were extraordinary, but the voting behavior that led to it was not. 
 
 ow did free and fair democratic elections lead to the extraordinary 
antidemocratic Nazi Party winning control of the Weimar  
Republic? The profound implications of this question have led “Who 
voted for Hitler?” to be the most studied question in the history of  
voting behavior research. Indeed, understanding who voted for Hitler is 
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especially timely now, given the increase in radical and extremist par-
ties in modern European elections. Yet, despite the overwhelming atten-
tion, scholars, mostly from history, sociology, and political science, 
have treated these elections as unique events and comparison with other 
elections as mostly irrelevant. The Nazi voting literature rarely draws 
on the extensive economic voting behavior literature or on modern sta-
tistical methods. That does not make the Nazi voting literature wrong, 
and we do not think it is wrong. But it suggests that learning something 
new about these extraordinary events may be possible. In this article, 
we offer a perspective on these elections that builds on the voting be-
havior literature and comparisons with other elections so that other 
scholars may be able to follow our example. We also introduce into this 
literature new methods of ecological inference designed specifically for 
this problem that increase the amount of information we can bring to 
bear on these venerable questions. Much of the current literature on the 
Weimar Republic treats the elections as a unique historical case, and in-
deed the consequences of the elections were extraordinary. In contrast, 
once we account for the underappreciated heterogeneity of voters’ in-
terests in these elections, we find that German voters responded in a 
fairly ordinary way, consistent with their interests and thus also consis-
tent with the dominant pattern of findings about democratic elections in 
other countries and time periods. 
 Although the limits of the available evidence generate considerable 
uncertainties in all analyses including those presented here, our research 
suggests a number of new conclusions. First, one of the leading theories 
in the literature—that the Nazis were a “catchall” party, because the 
swing in their favor occurred roughly uniformly across many different 
social groups—misses the fact that most elections from numerous coun-
tries display essentially the same type of uniform partisan swing. As 
such, this theory, while not wrong, does not distinguish the Weimar 
elections from most others and so cannot be used to help explain what 
happened here. We instead find that an incentives-based retrospective 
voting account of this series of elections helps to organize a large col-
lection of otherwise confusing facts. In particular, we find that the 
groups most hurt by the disastrous economic depression did not have 
homogeneous interests, and as a result did not behave in the same way. 
Those who were unemployed or at high risk of becoming unemployed 
gave disproportionate support to the Communists or, to a lesser extent, 
to the Social Democrats (in Protestant precincts), for good reason, 
whereas those who were hurt by the economy but were at little risk of 
unemployment—such as self-employed shopkeepers and professionals, 
domestic employees, and helping family members—constituted the 
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groups that gave the most disproportionate support to the Nazis. Only 
the failure of Nazi agricultural policy to address the specific preferences 
of farmers in southern Germany, as well as the powerful economic in-
centives provided by the Catholic Church in favor of the Catholic Zen-
trum party persuaded some of the working poor, in particular, domestic 
and peasant workers, to remain loyal to the Zentrum. Where no such 
additional incentives were at work, namely, in the Protestant regions of 
Weimar Germany, the full power of the incentives for the working poor 
made them the key constituency for the Nazis, with vote shares for the 
Nazis being many percentage points higher than the national swing. By 
contrast, other social groups in Protestant precincts did not vote for the 
Nazis more than average.  
 We begin with a description of the historical Nazi voting literature, 
from a modern perspective, summarize our main substantive arguments, 
and compare our approach to others. We then describe our data, discuss 
our new methods, and introduce the specific methodological problem 
we address. We then present our empirical results and conclude. 
 
THE HISTORICAL NAZI VOTING BEHAVIOR LITERATURE 
 
 From very early on, the paradox of a democratic system leading to 
the rise of an extreme antidemocratic party, and ultimately the end of 
democracy in a country, has generated great scholarly interest.1 The lit-
erature as a whole, however, remains unsatisfying even to its contribu-
tors.2 To understand the main issues and puzzles in the research on vot-
ing in the Weimar Republic, we summarize in this section the dominant 
historical explanations that have been offered. All teach us a great deal 
but each is nevertheless incomplete in at least some respects. These ex-




 The literature offers two categories of group-based theories. The ear-
liest is mass society theory, inspired by Javier Ortega y Gasset and oth-
ers, who see extremist movements as having their strongest appeal to 
individuals on the social periphery.3 Supporters of this approach focus 
on the irrational, anti-intellectual, and visceral nature of the Nazi appeal 
 
1 Geiger, “Panik” and Soziale Schichtung; Mierendorff, “Gesicht”; Palyi, “Economic Founda-
tions”; and Stephan, “Grenzen,” “Parteien,” and “Reichstagswahlen.” 
2 For a recent review, see Heilbronner and Mühlberger, “Achilles’ Heel.” 
3 Ortega y Gasset, Revolt; Loomis and Beegle, “Spread”; Bendix, Social Stratification; Korn-
hauser, Politics; and Arendt, Origins. 
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and they argue that this group was mostly composed of nonvoters.4 Al-
though this explanation is a favorite of political philosophers, recent 
studies have only rarely subjected it to empirical tests in real voting 
data. 
 The second category of group-based theories is class theory. First 
championed by Seymour Lipset and his followers, class theory holds 
that a different democratic and extremist form of political expression 
forms for each social group.5 The result is a set of idiosyncratic and 
group-specific “radicalization hypotheses.”6 However, scholars disagree 
as to the principles by which each class formulates or adopts each pos-
sible extremist expression. According to Lipset, “the ideal-typical Nazi 
voter in 1932 was a middle-class, self-employed Protestant who lived 
either on a farm or in a small community.”7 In contrast, Richard Hamil-
ton concluded that the upper classes (white-collar and self-employed) 
constituted core Nazi electoral support.8 Researchers also argue that the 
Angestellte, an important component of white-collar workers, were 
caught between the simultaneous (and partially self-contradictory) push 
of the NSDAP towards a modern world and a conservative society.9 
 There is yet another variant of the radicalization or class theory hy-
pothesis. Critics of the lower middle-class thesis emphasize that al-
though many in the lower middle class suffered from the Great Depres-
sion, not all of them became Nazi supporters. Walter Burnham provides 
an explanation in two parts: The Catholic Church armed some with 
enough social integration to keep them from falling prey to Nazi cam-
paign appeals.10 Others, such as the German lower middle class in Prot-
estant areas were more on their own and thus more prone to increasing 
support for the Nazis. A scholar writing today would probably say the 
same thing in different words, explaining that “social capital” in the 
Weimar Republic, in the form of confessional or religious ties, pro-
tected some groups from Nazi party appeals.11 Although many studies 
 
4 Rule, Theories, p. 93. 
5 See Lipset, Political Man; and Hagtvet, Theory. 
6 Falter and Zintl, “Economic Crisis.” 
7 Lipset, Political Man, p. 149. Lipset’s view that the Nazi vote was an aberration of middle- 
class political behavior was the first to challenge the Bendix mass society theory, but this debate 
came to an abrupt end when Bendix acquiesced to Lipset’s position in their joint article: “Lipset 
has convinced Bendix that the shift of nonvoters to the Nazis occurred only in 1933, whereas in 
the preceding elections middle-class extremists predominated among Nazi supporters” (p. 12). 
Miller and Robbins, “Who did Vote,” argue that this capitulation was premature. See also Jones, 
German Liberalism. 
8 Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler. 
9 Prinz, “Der unerwünschte Stand” and “Angestellte.” 
10 Burnham, “Political Immunisation.” 
11 Putnam, Bowling Alone. 
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support this theory, others show that the identification of the Catholic 
and industrial proletariat sections of the German population was not 
complete.12 
 In other words, almost any variant of an explanation that divides vot-
ers into social groups has been claimed to support class theory. This 
point does not necessarily make any of the variants wrong. It does sug-
gest, however, that “class theory” is more of a framework than a theory 
(that is, it is not an idea that could in principle be wrong). It is also un-
satisfying in that it seems to lead to complicated ad hoc explanations 
that do not help simplify anything. Such simplification is not always 




 Many scholarly and popular accounts subscribe to the view that the 
Nazi party is best understood as a “catchall” protest party that attracts 
votes from a wide band of the social-class spectrum, at least in the elec-
tion of 1930 or in the July 1932 election at the latest.13 Scholars who 
prefer this view do not believe that everyone voted for the Nazis to the 
same extent, but there is considerable emphasis on how support came 
from all corners of society, and how all groups moved in the same di-
rection and nearly the same magnitude.14 Peter Stachura, for example, 
finds that the Mittelstand thesis regarding the social composition of the 
NSDAP before 1933 has been superseded in the literature by the argu-
ment that the party was socially heterogeneous, with a substantial  
presence of the working class and other groups.15 
 
12 Falter, Social Foundations; Heberle, “Political Movements”; Brown, “Nazi Vote”; and 
Childers, Nazi Voter. 
13 See Childers, Nazi Voter; Falter, Hitlers Wähler; Kele, Nazis and Workers; Paul, Aufstand 
der Bilder; and Schieder, “Die NSDAP vor 1933.” Falter and Hänisch, “Wahlerfolge,” reach 
similar conclusions for Austria, although the NSDAP never obtained much support there as long 
as free elections were still taking place.  
14 See the detailed account in Brustein, Logic; Mommsen, “Verspielte Freiheit,” chapter 9; 
and Hartung, “Geschichte.” 
15 Stachura, “National Socialism.” The observation that the Nazis tried to tailor their cam-
paign to specific groups has led some to focus on the NSDAP’s superior propaganda machinery. 
For example, Ohr employed a detailed dataset for four Kreise in Hessen to show that propa-
ganda and political meetings had a positive effect on the massive NSDAP vote increase, medi-
ated by what Ohr calls the “nationalistic potential” of a community; Ohr, Nationalsozialistische 
Propaganda and “Nationalsozialistische Versammlungspropaganda.” However, in other con-
texts, Popkin, Reasoning Voter, demonstrates that the inference that voters are manipulated by 
commercials and speeches, while plausible at first sight, is often incorrect or at least needs to be 
enhanced by reference to the party’s policies and voters’ interests. 
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 A different variant of the catchall protest party perspective is the 
“mixed hypothesis” by Jürgen Falter and Reinhard Zintl.16 This view, 
carefully presented by Falter, was that up to the last election on March 
5, 1933, the NSDAP was a kind of people’s or mass integration party 
whose core supporters were the middle classes, but which could (at least 
since 1925) also count on support from blue-collar workers and the up-
per classes.17 This view has also been put forward by Eberhard Kolb, 
who subscribes to the notion that the NSDAP had its main support in 
the lower middle classes, but at the same time agrees with Hamilton that 
the upper and upper middle class were important constituents of the Na-
zis.18 Therefore, according to Falter, the NSDAP cannot be truly charac-
terized as purely a movement of the middle class. Rather, it was a 
“Volkspartei des Protests” (People’s Party of Protest). 
 The catchall perspective has several weaknesses. First, to a large ex-
tent, catchall theory also applies to most groups and almost all big or 
growing parties in almost all countries, and so it does not show how the 
Weimar elections were distinctive. The description may be accurate, but 
it does not provide an explanation for the outcome. The notion of a 
catchall party arises from a specific empirical observation that in fact 
holds fairly universally. The idea begins with the fact that voter support 
for political parties can always be decomposed into national swings for 
or against individual parties and variation around those swings across 
local districts or social groupings. A strong pattern of democratic elec-
toral politics, then, is that the two sources of variation are almost always 
unrelated. In other words, when one party receives x percent more of the 
vote nationwide, almost all districts and almost all social groups give  
x percent more of their vote to the party as well, plus or minus some 
random error.19 
 The fundamental problem with catchall theories and with observa-
tions of uniform partisan swing is that neither necessarily says anything 
about which individuals voted for the Nazis. Recognizing these pat-
terns, however, does enable us to isolate a dominant feature that might 
otherwise confound the identification of the patterns we seek to under-
stand. The key to understanding what was special about the elections in 
 
16 Falter and Zintl, “Economic Crisis.” 
17 Falter, Hitlers Wähler. 
18 Kolb, Weimar Republic. 
19 The idea that partisan swing is approximately uniform across geographic districts dates to 
Butler, “Appendix.” It has been generalized to a stochastic model that fits electoral data in Gel-
man and King, “Unified Method,” for two parties and Katz and King, “Statistical Model,” for 
multiple parties. For an example of the notion that citizen support for political candidates shifts 
uniformly across most social groups in the same direction and extent as the national swing, see 
Gelman and King, “American Presidential.” 
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Weimar Germany is to calculate properly the swings for all groups and 
to explain how each deviates from the nationwide average. This proce-
dure, which we implement below, removes the gross, ordinary features 
of the election, and leaves the distinctive aspects to explain. As we 
show, what is distinctive about the Weimar elections is the particular 
incentive structure of the voters, which helps explain voting behavior 
there in much the same “ordinary” terms as elections in other times and 
places. The same procedure is productive, for the same reasons, in  
analyzing most elections. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT 
 
 We follow the literature and take for granted that support for the Nazi 
party swung, as it did, from less than 3 percent of eligible voters in the 
December 1924 election to 31.1 percent in July 1932, 26.5 percent in 
November 1932, and 38.7 percent in March 1933.20 Although this par-
ticular swing is obviously unique to Weimar Germany, we expect (and 
find) that this swing, like almost all national swings, affects the majority 
of social groups in almost the same way. The interesting question is 
which groups voted for the Nazis differently than the average. In an-
swering this question, we focus on incentives in voting for the Nazis. 
Consequently, although our results suggest that the economic voting 
approach explains much variation of the voting for the other parties as 
well, we do not claim to present a unified and complete picture of vot-
ing in the Weimar Republic. We do not say much about the causes of 
the swing itself, about which an enormous amount has been written.21 
After the extreme hyperinflation of the years 1922/23, the years 1924–
1928 were characterized by an economic boom and are frequently re-
ferred to as the “Golden Twenties.” However, already in 1927 and 
1928, the leading indicators were beginning to show the first signs of a 
recession.22 In contrast to Great Britain, France, and the United States, 
the German slump began with a gradual slide into depression. One 
highly contested hypothesis about the source of this slide is that high la-
bor costs implied an “unavoidable” policy of deflation, while others see 
the cause in high interest rates and the unfortunate intervention of the 
 
20 See O’Loughlin, “Electoral Geography,” for an excellent description of the swings and spa-
tial patterns.  
21 See Barkai, Wirtschaftssystem, for a comprehensive analysis and Balderston, Economics, 
for a succinct summary of the Weimar economy in the years between the wars. 
22 James, Economic Reasons. 
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German Reichsbank.23 Whatever the exact mechanism, the national 
product reached its peak in 1928 and declined in the following years, 
leading to the loss of more than a quarter of GNP between 1929 and 
1932. Unemployment started to rise, bankruptcy was rampant among 
firms, and the explicit policy of deflation started to show effects  
beginning in 1930. 
 These economic circumstances would be enough in elections in any 
other country to cause a swift exit from the ruling or established parties, 
and from moderate opposition parties to even more extreme opponents 
of the government as seemed to occur in Weimar Germany. In addition, 
Weimar Germany had a very young parliamentary system at the time, 
and so voter loyalties to the political system, if they would have existed 
in the face of such dire economic times, would likely not have been suf-
ficiently entrenched to slow the electoral swings.24 We therefore regard 
the national swing itself, and the fact that most groups and geographic 
areas shifted in roughly uniform amounts in the same direction as the 
national swing, as a fact common to democracies, not something that 
explains this election in particular. Instead, we look for what is unusual 
about group behavior in these elections in the same way as we would in 
any other election. We therefore ask which voter groups gave dispro-
portionate support to the Nazis, support clearly more than or less than 
the national swing.  
 We consider two centrally important groupings, both of which have 
been studied separately, but not in the way we combine them. We con-
sider the important distinction between Protestant and Catholic regions; 
no analysis of the Weimar Republic can ignore the differences between 
these regions, though scholars have emphasized them for different rea-
sons. While some have studied whether Catholicism per se was less 
compatible with the Nazi movement, we emphasize the fact that the 
 
23 See the discussion between Borchardt, “Zwangslagen und Handlungsspielräume”; Holtfre-
rich, “Zu hohe Löhne”; von Kruedener, Economic Crisis; Ritschl, “Zu hohe Löhne”; and Bor-
chardt, Economic Causes. Also see Voth, “High Wages” and “Bang.” 
24 Indeed, consistent with Hibbs, “Economic Outcomes,” some scholars have studied macro-
economic variables and aggregate voting results for evidence about the effect of the inflation 
and unemployment of the 1920s on democracy as a form of government. See Palyi, “Economic 
Foundations,” for an early account in this vein. Hill, Butler, and Lorenzen, “Inflation and the 
Destruction,” argue that the great inflation of 1919–1923, in particular, laid the groundwork for 
the destruction of democracy in Germany. Frey and Weck, “Arbeitslosigkeit,” report a positive 
association between the NSDAP vote at Reichstags elections and unemployment, but see Falter 
et al., “Arbeitslosigkeit tatsächlich.” More recently, van Riel and Schram, “Weimar Economic 
Decline,” have estimated a version of Kirchgässner’s “Rationality, Causality” model of gov-
ernment popularity and find that lower real wages and higher unemployment significantly de-
pressed government popularity, thus making room for the Nazi party to step into the vacuum. 
Our results, although consistent with some of these macro-level results, are more focused on in-
dividual-level behavior. 
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Catholic Church supported especially the Zentrum and related parties 
through direct and indirect economic incentives. Moreover, we find that 
the agricultural policies of the Nazis did not suit well the preferences of 
the people living in southern and western Germany, that is, the Catholic 
regions. The second dimension is that we also retain the focus on social 
groups common in both the Nazi and political science voting behavior 
literatures. The reason for this focus in both literatures is that different 
social groups tend, in most elections, to vote in clearly recognizable and 
predictable ways, at least relative to one another. However, for both the 
religious dimension as well as the social one, we use a different orga-
nizing principle from the culturally based explanations common in the 
Nazi voting literature. Cultural explanations, which make arguments 
about the propensities of particular social groups to prefer certain par-
ties at specific times, are often “trivially” true or hard to disprove be-
cause they seem capable of fitting almost any observed behavior. The 
economic voting behavior literature has moved away from this style of 
explanation towards one based more on economic and other incentives. 
We follow this approach, and also William Brustein, who applied it in 
the context of who joined the Nazi party as members (rather than vot-
ers).25 We wish to explore how far the incentive-based explanation can 
take us, but we do not view this approach as the only way to study 
Weimar Germany (or, for that matter, any other election). 
 From the perspective of incentives, the most obvious answer to the 
question of which groups gave disproportionate support to the Nazis is 
those who were hurt most by the severe economic depression. In even 
simpler terms, to answer the question of who voted for the Nazis, we 
might look for voter groups most likely to want to “throw the bums 
out.” Although in retrospect it turned out that the “bums” voted into of-
fice through the elections leading up to 1933 were far worse than those 
in office previously, even the political science voting behavior literature 
often assumes that most voter decisions are based on judgments about 
incumbents, about whom voters have behavioral evidence, instead of 
about challengers who can convey little but costless promises. A more 
formal version of this idea is “retrospective voting,” which holds that 
citizens would like to base voting decisions on their prospective evalua-
tions of how candidates are likely to behave in office. However, the 
 
25 See Brustein, Logic. Stögbauer, “Radicalisation,” while sidestepping inferences about indi-
vidual-level behavior, also provides valuable insights into Nazi voting behavior from a similar 
perspective. 
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only reasonable measure of (unobservable) prospective evaluations is 
(observable) retrospective evaluations.26 
 Adapting these interest-based theories to the Nazi voting literature 
would seem straightforward: voter groups that were dissatisfied the 
most should be those that the depression hurt the most. Thus, Brustein 
and Falter argue that “as groups became disaffected with the Weimar 
system and experienced higher deprivation, they embraced Nazism.”27 
This is clear logic, but of course the theory of retrospective voting, de-
signed for two-party systems, cannot explain where the voters will go 
when they withdraw support from the governing parties in a compli-
cated multiparty electoral environment.28 Our task then is to identify 
factors that explain why certain groups of voters leaving the governing 
parties (or leaving the nonvoters) turned to the Nazis rather than other 
out parties like the Communists. 
 Our approach to the heterogeneity within those voters most hurt by 
the economic depression is to focus on the most relevant but simple 
categories.29 First are the unemployed and blue-collar workers at high 
risk of unemployment (such as those in high unemployment precincts). 
The government did have social welfare policies designed for them (un-
employment insurance existed since October 1927) and so did have 
some supporters among the unemployed. (The insurance program was 
dismantled between March 1930 and July 1932.) However, our research 
confirms earlier evidence that when the unemployed opposed the gov-
ernment, they turned primarily to the Communists, whose policies ca-
tered directly to them, not the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis promoted 
autonomy, entrepreneurship, and private property, ideas which were not 
directed to the unemployed. In addition, Hitler’s economic agenda (e.g., 
for example, Strasser’s 1932 program) was focused on improving the 
general economic situation; even the proposals for obligatory work 
were not typically viewed as measures to improve the situation of the 
unemployed, but as means to stimulate the economy as a whole. Even in 
 
26 See Fiorina, Retrospective Voting; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree, “Fiscal Policy Outcomes”; and 
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, Macro Polity. Retrospective voting per se does not predict that 
voters would necessarily turn to the Nazis in particular just because they were dissatisfied with 
governing or established parties. However, while formal theories of retrospective voting relate 
to rewards and punishments for governing parties, even parties not in government can be pun-
ished by voters. A prime example in the Weimar Republic is the way the SPD was punished for 
its tacit collusion with the Brüning government in 1932. On the other hand, many scholars be-
lieve that a party that brings “fresh hopes” (Brustein, Logic, p. 72) can benefit from retrospec-
tive voting precisely because it has never participated in government (Brustein, Logic, p. 75). 
27 Brustein, Logic, p. 397. 
28 See also Brustein, Logic; and Wellhofer, “Democracy.” 
29 See Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution, for a vivid picture of each of the social 
groups. 
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1933, we find that Hitler’s attempts to attract the unemployed had 
largely failed, perhaps because Strasser’s “Sofortprogramm” was so 
short lived.30 
 In contrast, we find that those who were hurt most by the depression 
and wound up supporting the Nazis were those at little risk of being un-
employed. These include two groups that together we refer to as the 
working poor, which is a phrase used in the field of American politics 
within political science and within sociology, but has not previously 
been used to describe Weimar Germany.31 We use it because the groups 
described this way were indeed working and they were poor, despite 
having other important characteristics. The group that fits this descrip-
tion most directly are the self-employed (Selbständige), the independent 
artisans, shopkeepers, small farmers, lawyers, etc.32 Most accounts as-
sume the self-employed were fervent supporters of the Nazis.33 These 
individuals were hurt economically by the depression, but because they 
owned their firms they were at relatively low risk of unemployment. In-
stead, bad economic times would merely mean that they would make 
less money, often a lot less. Indeed, the crushing economic depression 
hit shop owners especially hard. It is true that this group also feared that 
they would lose the independence that their self-owned businesses pro-
vided and that their low earnings would force them to take regular jobs 
with a large firm; however, their main concern appears not to have been 
unemployment. As such, they were not moved by the social welfare 
policies of the government or those promised by the Communists. 
 Much of the Nazi’s campaign appeal was heavily focused on amelio-
rating the economic depression and stabilizing the value of money. Al-
though the Nazis did not document an economic program until the “So-
fortprogramm” of May 1932 and the less concrete “Aufbauprogramm” 
with which they campaigned in November 1932, their economic ideas 
had been developing for over a decade. Nazi economic thinking had its 
roots in the national or statist school and has been compared to Keynes-
ian economics (although there is no consensus in the literature, neither 
regarding its actual closeness to Keynesian economics, nor regarding its 
 
30 Barkai, Wirtschaftssystem, p. 39. 
31 Duneier, Slim’s Table.  
32 In the data, a small fraction of the group of self-employed are the large industrial tycoons, 
who are unlikely to be poor. Their presence is unlikely to drive our results, and our data does 
not allow us to separate them from the core of the working poor. The question of to which ex-
tent big business contributed to the rise of the Nazis, not through votes, but through economic 
and indirect political support, has been controversially discussed in the literature. See Turner, 
German Big Business; and Hayes, Industry. 
33 See, for example, Geiger, Soziale Schichtung; Lipset, Political Man; and Saldern, Mittels-
tand. 
962 King, Rosen, Tanner, and Wagner 
  
  
actual effects).34 The Nazis focused strongly on state socialism and au-
tarkic development. Indeed, some have argued that Nazi economics had 
close similarities with Soviet economies.35 However, Christoph Buch-
heim and Jonas Scherner provide convincing evidence that in fact pri-
vate property played a central role in the Nazi economic thinking.36 
NSDAP leaders also were in favor of urging investment in new capital 
goods, ensuring a cheap money policy, and initiating public investment. 
These policies appealed to self-employed individuals across the eco-
nomic spectrum. Through denouncing government and big business, the 
Nazis could win friends among small shopkeepers and other independ-
ent folk (that is, in fact, what literally means Selbständige).37 The party 
also complained about the reparation payments. In particular, they 
claimed that these payments to Germany’s enemies had the effect of re-
ducing purchasing power, decreasing employment, and reducing oppor-
tunities for business for the self-employed in Germany. At the same 
time, the NSDAP’s proposal of intensive development of Germany’s 
own economic resources was very much what many of the Selbständige 
craved. In addition, the NSDAP was perceived as a party that favored 
social mobility, which should have been popular among the entire 
working poor group. The party actively promoted private property and 
so turned off many unemployed, who either had little private property 
or generally supported more government intervention in the economy. 
 In the working poor category we also include another group which 
has surprisingly been neglected by scholars, despite its considerable 
size: domestic employees (who were particularly important in agricul-
ture) and family members who helped their relatives and who were of-
ten classified in previous research as “others.” Like the self-employed, 
domestic employees and such helping family members suffered from 
the economic downturn, but they seldom became unemployed and were 
normally at little risk of unemployment. Some were living with and 
working for the self-employed and could not really be fired. The wel-
fare system, which the government tried hard to maintain through the 
economic crises, had no particular attraction for them.38 They had a 
 
34 Barkai, Nazi Economics, especially chapters 1 and 2. See, for example, Abelshauser, 
“Kriegswirtschaft”; Buchheim, “Erholung”; and Ritschl, “Hat das Dritte Reich.” 
35 For example, see Temin, “Soviet and Nazi Planning.” 
36 Buchheim and Scherner, “Role.” For an earlier discussion, see Ritschl, “Wirtschaftspoli-
tik”; and James, German Slump. 
37 See above for the relation between big business and the self-employed in our sample. 
38 We note that our sample covers registered domestic workers. Some domestic servants did 
become unemployed, but did not necessarily show up as unemployed in the data because dwin-
dling unemployment relief decreased the incentives to register as unemployed. See, for exam-
ple, Hemmer, “Die unsichtbaren Arbeitslosen.” 
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hard time getting by, but their thinking must have been substantially dif-
ferent from that of the unemployed. In particular, they did not favor ex-
propriation and community property, as the Communists did. Instead, 
they looked for a party that promised that they could make a better  
living. The Nazis were, for their time, the obvious candidate.  
 One important group among the domestic workers were agricultural 
laborers and peasant workers. Originally, the Nazi program had called 
for the expropriation of land for the commonwealth, which is hardly a 
suitable incentive to win farm votes. However, in April 1928, Hitler in-
terpreted this point to mean that the program was directed against Jew-
ish real estate speculators. In addition, in March 1930 the NSDAP pub-
lished a detailed agrarian program which promised the peasants not only 
redress of their present grievances, but also a place of honor within the 
nation. Accordingly, Werner Angress asks: “Where else could the peas-
ants have gone but to the Nazis?”39 This argument is consistent with our 
finding that while the peasant workers did not support the Nazis very 
strongly in 1924 and 1928, their support skyrocketed in 1930 and 1932 
in Protestant precincts. However, although the Nazis also aimed to pro-
vide local relief through various programs, their proposals did not have 
the same appeal to the domestic and especially peasant workers in the 
areas of southern and western Germany (which were mostly Catholic).  
 One problem was that the Nazis favored the reintroduction of a com-
pulsory system of impartible inheritance. They also supported (though 
not necessarily only as a means of agrigultural policy) plans to resettle 
the disinherited in eastern Germany (East Elbia). But a law of impart-
ible inheritance did not appeal to southern and western farm families, 
who could subsist on a small parcel of land thanks to intensive cultiva-
tion and higher yields.40 Since the typical farming system in the south 
and west surrounded the town or village, farm families often had mem-
bers employed in nonfarming trades too, which allowed them to make 
do on small plots. The prospects of relocating to East Elbia were proba-
bly not appealing to anybody. But they would have especially put off all 
domestic workers, peasants, and agricultural laborers in the South and 
West. 
 In Catholic regions, domestic workers and the self-employed also had 
different interests. As far as general economic policies were concerned, 
the self-employed class did not benefit much from the governmental 
program.41 For example, they did not benefit from the higher  
 
39 Angress, “Political Role,” p. 547. 
40 See Kretschmar, Deutsche Agrarprogramme, for an early account of the agricultural poli-
cies relevant to the various voter groups. 
41 Brustein, Logic, p. 73. 
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unemployment compensation for workers and new governmental subsi-
dies and preferential tariffs for grain growers at the expense of livestock 
farmers.42 By contrast, there is some evidence that in terms of votes of 
domestic workers, the Zentrum (and, in Bavaria, the BVP) benefited 
from social welfare programs at the local level. These programs, em-
bedded in an extensive network of social and political organizations, 
were also closely linked with the Catholic Church.43 The Zentrum in 
turn provided aid to parochial schools.44 Günter Plum, for example, ar-
gues that especially for peasants, participation in organizations cospon-
sored by the church was at least partially motivated by material inter-
ests.45 Given the power of the church in influencing vote decisions (see 
below), we would expect the Catholic peasants and domestic voters to 
have given less support to the Nazis. And while all local welfare pro-
grams, throughout Germany, are likely to have been cash strapped, the 
situation in Catholic regions appears to have been somewhat less dra-
matic because of these long-standing links. To the extent that similar 
support does not appear to have been available to the self-employed, 
domestic workers and the self-employed are likely to have voted  
differently. 
 The Catholic Church supported the Zentrum and its related parties in 
other ways as well, adding to the incentives for voters to favor the 
Catholic parties in Catholic regions.46 First, there was a personal link. 
To give just two examples, Johann Leicht, longtime chairman of the 
BVP Reichstag delegation, was a clergyman. Heinreich Brauns, a priest, 
served as minister of labor from 1920–1928. Second, the Catholic 
Church strongly encouraged voters not to vote for the Nazis.47 Con-
versely, at least some in the Nazi party described the Catholic Church as 
alien (artfremd). The DNVP, DDP, and DVP, competing for the Protes-
tant vote, did not have a similar force on their side, leading us to predict 
that the domestic workers, who were arguably more influenced by the 
clergy than the business oriented self-employed, should vote differently 
in Protestant and Catholic precincts. One might, of course, doubt 
whether voting suggestions by the Catholic parish priest were heeded in 
 
42 Ibid., p. 67. 
43 Childers, Nazi Voter, p. 189. 
44 Brustein, Logic, p. 40. 
45 Plum, Gesellschaftsstruktur, p. 81, 104. 
46 We treat Zentrum and BVP jointly, even though they also frequently fought about policy. 
For a detailed analysis of the reasons why Zentrum and BVP never merged, see Schönhoven, 
Bayerische Volkspartei 1924–1932, as well as Ruppert, Zentrum. Perhaps part of the reason why 
the Zentrum and the BVP could remain attractive in the 1930s was their resistance against many 
of Brüning’s policies, and the special agreements they were thus able to negotiate for their con-
sistuencies, see Schönhoven, Bayerische Volkspartei 1924–1932, pp. 245–52. 
47 Falter, Hitlers Wähler, p. 188. 
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the polling booth. It seems at least possible, though, that in small villages, 
voting may not have been completely secret. While we have not been 
able to unearth sources that speak directly to this issue, it is true even 
today that in small villages word spreads fast when somebody deviates 
from what is expected.48 
 In sum, we predict that the working poor were drawn towards the 
Nazis in general, but that domestic and peasant workers in Catholic pre-
cincts would favor the Zentrum and related parties for two reasons: the 
Nazi agricultural policy did not appeal to peasant workers in Catholic 
precincts; and domestic workers in Catholic regions benefited from 
government programs (while the self-employed did not). In addition, 
the self-employed would not be as heavily influenced by the Catholic 
Church because the benefits from Nazi policy in favor of small business 
were just too tempting. 
 That the Catholic-Protestant dimension is an important explanatory 
factor in voting in the Weimar Republic is, of course, neither new nor 
surprising. What this article adds to the existing literature is the notion 
that within those groups more open to additional economic incentives, 
namely, the Protestants, the working poor were those with the greatest 
incentives to vote for the Nazis. The economic incentives for the work-
ing poor to favor the Nazis were certainly in Catholic precincts, but they 
had a harder time overcoming the incentives provided by the Catholic 
Church and the Zentrum. 
 Finally, we note that the complicated effect of job and inflation inse-
curity on German voters is consistent with or at least relevant to experi-
ences elsewhere. For example, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schloz-
man study why American politics was not similarly radicalized in the 
Depression.49 Since at least Paul Eisenberg and Philip Lazarsfeld, the 
profound effects have been well known.50 Verba and Schlozman show 
that the American dream of rugged individualism and optimism about 
the future seemed to substitute for greater radicalism. In contrast, Roger 
Myerson tracks the different experiences of the United States and  
Germany to institutional deficiencies of the Weimar constitution.51 In 
Germany, we find that the unemployed chose the Communists over the 
Nazis as their radical party for fairly instrumental reasons. Analogously, 
Anthony Mughan and Dean Lacy demonstrate that job insecurity (as 
 
48 Consistent with this idea, Brustein, Logic, p. 171, analyzes how individuals weighed the 
expected benefits and costs of joining the Nazi party and describes the power of social networks 
in making the costs of joining the Nazi party unacceptable.  
49 Verba and Schlozman, “Unemployment.” 
50 Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld, “Psychological Effects.” 
51 Myerson, “Political Economics.” 
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distinct from short-term economic performance and macro-levels of un-
employment) was a major determinant of the vote for Perot in the 1996 
U.S. presidential election, since neither major party candidate had much 
to offer for people concerned about this issue.52 The working poor in the 
Weimar Republic may have experienced a similar, or more urgently 
desperate, concern. 
 The two simple organizing principles we propose—incentives of the 
working poor throughout Germany and incentives in favor of the Zen-
trum, especially in Catholic areas—of course cannot explain all of the 
enormous complexity of voting in the Weimar Republic. For example, 
as we do not have a model of how voters analyzed the party environ-
ment strategically, we cannot test a tactical or strategic voting theory. 
Although this probably was important in the 1920s, this omission is less 
of a concern in later years. The small, single issue parties diminished in 
importance starting with Brüning’s increasing use of presidential de-
crees from October 1930. While in the Reichstag elections up to 1930, 
the small parties taken together received vote shares on the order of 10 
percent of the eligible votes, their share dropped to 2 percent in the elec-
tions of 1932 and 1933. Other strategic voting aspects, for example, the 
notion that voters vote for an outlandish party simply to shock a gov-
ernment they expect to survive (in the spirit of the “protest” aspect of 
Thomas Childers’ thesis), may also be important. To the extent these 
motivations are important, the empirical picture we obtain by testing the 
economic voting perspective is necessarily going to be blurred. 
 Our results contrast with the popular, though recently not empirically 
supported suggestion that the main class basis of Nazi support came 
from blue-collar workers and the unemployed. It is also distinct from 
Hamilton’s idea of the upper-class white collar and self-employed being 
the core supporters of the Nazis. And through its focus on dispropor-
tionate support, it is different from the catchall party view which marks 
the main conclusion of Childers’ and Falter’s sophisticated analysis. 
Each of these previous approaches is correct to a degree, and each adds 
considerably even if one takes our view as accurate, since the swing to 
the Nazis affected all the groups. But as we show below the groups 
which responded disproportionately in favor of the Nazis were those we 
call the working poor, and those who reacted disproportionately against 
the Nazis were the unemployed. Finally, our strategy of inquiry and our 
results follow but remain distinct from Brustein’s, whose work on Nazi 
party membership is based on a somewhat different organization of 
classes and demographic groupings. 
 
52 Mughan and Lacy, “Economic Performance.” 





 To address the questions that motivate this article, we put together an 
extensive set of aggregate election data on Weimar Germany, covering 
Reichstag elections from December 1924 to March 1933 (the March 
1933 election is typically not viewed as free or fair, but its analysis is 
nonetheless interesting). We do not consider presidential or state elec-
tions; our study shares this limitation with most of the existing work. 
We begin with the electoral data from Dirk Hänisch and Falter and add 
(occupational) data from the 1933 German Census.53 We first aggre-
gated the units into 1,248 official electoral districts. Because the 
boundaries of some districts changed over time, we ensured logical  
consistency by aggregating some of the districts and producing 681  
contiguous units (which we refer to as “precincts” or Kreise) whose 
boundaries were relatively stable over time. These precincts tile the 
country (except for one small area in Prussia due to the absence of data, 
and French-occupied Saarland). We aggregated the data by hand,  
comparing two detailed contemporary paper maps with electronic 
boundary files prepared by Colin Flint, and by studying population 
changes over time.54 We have made these data, and all information  
necessary to reproduce our empirical results, publicly available on the 
Dataverse Network.55 
 To conduct our empirical analysis, we begin by dividing the country 
into six regions of the 681 precincts defined by the cross-classification 
of the level of unemployment and religion (or “confession,” as it is 
called in the Nazi voting literature), both of which strongly correlate 
with Nazi voter support. Unemployment is grouped into three catego-
ries: low (<10 percent), middle (10–20 percent), and high (>20 percent) 
areas. We considered two religious groups: Protestant (>50 percent) 
versus Catholic and others, using data from the 1925 Census. The six 
resulting regions correspond to some of the major, and easily measur-
able, differences between different geographic areas in Germany. We 
apply our es- timation method within each of our six regions separately. 
That greatly reduces homogeneity assumptions (although it obviously 
does not eliminate them), improves our estimates, and lets us learn more 
about variation across the regions. Creating more regions might reduce 
the homogeneity assumptions further but would probably increase the 
  
 
53 Falter and Hänisch, “Wahl- und Sozialdaten”; and Falter, Wahl- und Sozialdaten. 
54 Office of Strategic Services, “Greater Germany Kreis Boundaries”; and Hammond, [Map 
of] Germany. 
55 See King, Rosen, Tanner, and Wagner, “Replication Data.” 






SIX REGIONS BASED ON RELIGION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Note: The smaller circumscriptions are administrative precincts (Kreise) in Weimar Germany. 
Source: See the text. 
 
variance of the resulting estimates. Clearly, much further research could 
be profitably conducted into optimal grouping schemes. 
 The map in Figure 1 portrays our regions and shows the extensive spa-
tial clustering that our six-part grouping takes into account. The Protes-
tant areas (shaded) lie mostly in the Northeast, and the Catholic regions 
in the Southwest. Through the entire country, the areas of highest unem-
ployment are the cities, the largest of which have been labelled. (The  
region in the middle of the country with high unemploy ment was also 
urban but with cities of smaller sizes.)  
 Table 1 summarizes the sizes of each of these six regions in different 
ways. The data include two additional sets of observed variables for each 
of the 681 precincts. First are election results for each political party in 
each precinct. Because many parties stood for office in the elections we 
are interested in, we group them based on ideology. Our categories  
 




SIZE OF OUR SIX REGIONS 
Religion  Unemployment Precincts Workforce 1933
Percent of 
Workforce 
Protestant  low  145  3,598,176 11 
Protestant  medium  175  5,819,807 18 
Protestant  high  124  13,307,338 41 
Catholic  low  134  2,847,738 9 
Catholic  medium  71  2,435,575 8 
Catholic  high  32  4,037,088 13 
Source: See the text. 
 
include the Far Left (KPD, the Communist Party); the parties in the Left 
and Center, including primarily the Left (SPD, the Social Democrats) 
and the Catholic and Center parties (Zentrum and BVP, Bayerische 
Volkspartei); the Far Right (DNVP, Deutschnationale Volkspartei); the 
Liberals (DDP, Deutsche Demokratische Partei (later DStP, Deutsche 
Staatspartei) and DVP, Deutsche Volkspartei); and the Nazi Party 
(NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). We grouped 
several parties that were small enough to not materially  
affect the results together with nonvoters.56 This categorization is finer 
grained than the vast majority of empirical analyses in the literature, but 
it of course still reflects compromises that result from aggregating some 
parties into larger groups that make statistical analyses feasible. For  
example, since our primary interest is to study voting for the Nazis,  
future research could use the same method to understand in more detail 
how the Germans voted for the Zentrum and the SPD separately. 
 Before the start of serious economic difficulties, the SPD and Zentrum 
had steady support from the voters, while the Liberals and the Far Right 
were losing votes even then. However, after the economy began to nose-
dive, the two center parties quickly lost support, and previous nonvoters 
turned out for the Nazis. In November 1932 the picture inverts briefly, 
but the trend towards the Nazis continued in March 1933. 
  The second set of observed variables includes five occupational 
groups coded from the 1933 German Census, focusing on voters in the 
(potential) workforce.57 These include the self-employed (Selbständige, 
i.e., independent artisans, shopkeepers, small farmers, and a smaller 
group of industrial employers that we cannot separate out), blue-collar 
workers, white-collar workers (about 31 percent Beamte and about 69  
  
 
56 The composition of this group changes over time as parties appeared and disappeared. 
57 See Falter and Hänisch, Wahl- und Sozialdaten. 




THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, JULY 1932 
 Far Left 
Left/ 
Center Far Right Nazi Liberal 
No Vote/ 
Other Sum 
Self-employed ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.164 
Blue collar ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.314 
White collar ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.144 
Domestic ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.197 
Unemployed ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.181 
Sum 0.120 0.311 0.049 0.311 0.018 0.191 1.000 
Source: See the text. 
 
percent Angestellte), domestic employees and helping family members, 
and the unemployed.58 Of the unemployed, more than 97 percent are 
unemployed white-collar or blue-collar workers, whereas the rest be-
long to the domestic group. An important dividing line is that between 
small shopkeepers (in the self-employed group) and industrial workers 
and managers (in the white-collar group). In previous studies, the self-
employed and domestic employees have often been lumped together 
into one group. As discussed above, our functional grouping allows us 
more meaningful tests of our theory than purely class-based categoriza-
tion schemes. We also included data on religion from the 1925 Census. 
We would have preferred to include data on occupation and religion 
collected at the time of each election, or interpolated from more than 




 Within each of the six regions of precincts defined by unemployment 
and religion, the key substantive issue is filling in the cells in a cross-
classification like that in Table 2. The rightmost column of the table 
gives the proportion of people in each occupational group, whereas the 
last row indicates the proportions of individuals who cast their ballots 
for each of our political party groupings. 
 While the margins of this table are observed, and the margins of 
analogous tables like it are observed for each precinct, the cells in the 
table (denoted by question marks) are not known and must be estimated. 
Indeed, the goal of the Nazi voting literature and this article is to fill in 
numbers for the question marks—for example, what fraction of  
self-employed people voted for the Nazis. The reason for the lack of 
 
58 To construct the sample split between low, medium, and high unemployment areas, we use 
unemployment in 1933 as a proxy for unemployment in all the other years. Clearly, this proxy is 
imperfect for the earlier years, but we do not presently have better data. 
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knowledge is that Weimar Germany had a secret ballot and so which 
people or type of people voted for each party was not recorded or re-
ported. The two sources of data, census and electoral, cannot be linked 
at the individual level. The task of filling in a table from information 
about its margins is known as ecological inference. 
 An alternative way of looking at the problem is to study patterns only 
in the observed variables (the spatial variation in the margins across the 
tables for each precinct) and to make no ecological inferences. This  
approach dates at least to Rudolf Heberle, James Pollock, and Charles 
Loomis and J. Allan Beegle and has newer adherents.59 It also encom-
passes a great deal of qualitative work on how the NSDAP took advan-
tage of regional-national tensions by centralizing their propaganda  
activities while remaining sensitive to local and regional diversity pro-
duced by centuries of cultural and historical legacies, for example, in 
Lower Saxony and in the city of Marburg.60 Although we find this type 
of spatial research to be informative for many questions, our interest in 
which individuals voted for the Nazis requires ecological inferences, 
and hence different methods.  
 Two sources of ecological information in the marginals have been 
used to make inferences about the cell entries—deterministic and statis-
tical. For example, Hamilton used deterministic information when he 
examined about two dozen areas that gave homogeneous voting support 
to the Nazis, since we know for certain that whoever voted in those ar-
eas supported the Nazis.61 His procedure, which was to examine the 
housing stock in each area, tells us essentially without error (other than 
errors in using housing stock to infer class status) who where the Nazi 
supporters. The problem with this approach is that it only applies to the 
homogeneous areas. As it turns out, however, deterministic information 
is available for every area. So, for example, if in one precinct 635 peo-
ple voted for the Nazis, and 247 people were domestic employees, then 
we know for certain that the number of domestic employees in this area 
voting for the Nazis was between 0 and 247. Converting the quantity of 
interest to the proportion of domestic employees voting for the Nazis 
will give upper and lower proportions that are directly calculable in any 
precinct. 
 The advantage of deterministic information is that it is known for  
certain, conditional only on the data being correct. The disadvantage is 
that the bounds are sometimes too wide to provide much information. In 
 
59 Heberle, From Democracy; Pollock, “Areal Study”; and Loomis and Beegle, “Spread.” For 
example, see O’Loughlin, Flint, and Anselin, “Geography.” 
60 Noakes, Nazi Party; and Koshar, Social Life. 
61 Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? 
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fact, Hamilton effectively discarded all Kreise where the bounds were 
not of width zero. This meant that the conclusions he drew about a few 
areas were highly informative, but it also means, if these areas differ 
from the rest of Germany, that his results may reflect selection bias of 
almost any direction or magnitude. Of course, Hamilton was aware of 
this, and could not be expected to put as much work into all of the rest 
of Germany as he did in these two dozen areas, but of course it severely 
limits the degree to which his results can be generalized. Indeed, it  
appears that Kreis-level data from all of Germany were not used until 
about 1980.62 In our case, we are working from nationwide quantitative 
information, and so we avoid the selection bias by using all available 
deterministic information from all precincts in the entire country. 
 The second source of information in the marginals is statistical. For 
example, Childers correlated the fraction of blue-collar workers in an 
area with the fraction voting for the Nazis.63 He found that areas with 
many blue-collar workers were also areas that gave many votes to the 
Nazis and thus concluded that the blue collar were Nazi supporters. This 
is of course possible, but it could also be completely wrong. It could in 
fact be the white-collar workers or others who happen to live in areas 
with many blue-collar workers who are voting for the Nazis. If so, a  
correlation at the aggregate level could have nothing to do with individ-
ual level behavior—which is the definition of what is called the eco-
logical fallacy. Of course, the statistics do contain some information, 
and can be helpful when used carefully. 
 The only method used to extract deterministic information from  
aggregate data in the entire Nazi voting literature was introduced half a 
century ago by Otis Duncan and Beverly Davis.64 In fact, the only 
method regularly used in this literature to extract statistical information 
dates to the same year.65 The same venerable methods also dominated 
other fields that made ecological inferences until Gary King showed 
how to combine both sources of information in the same model.66 A  
variety of other methods have subsequently been proposed that also 
combine both sources of information.67 But few apply to tables as large 
as in Table 2 and none are used much in applications. As such, we  
developed new techniques to study voting in Weimar Germany that  
extend this approach combining deterministic and statistical information 
 
62 Brown, “Nazi Vote”; and Passchier, “Electoral Geography.” 
63 Childers, “Social Bases” and Nazi Voter. 
64 Duncan and Davis, “Alternative.” 
65 Goodman, “Ecological Regressions.” 
66 King, Solution; and Schuessler, “Ecological Inference.” 
67 King, Rosen, and Tanner, Ecological Inference. 
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in a way that works for arbitrarily large tables. We published details of 
these models elsewhere, and the methodology, although designed  
specifically for the problem in this article, has already been adopted by 
others for different applications.68 
 As in King’s work, the key to our approach is to limit the sample 
space to the deterministic bounds for the quantities of interest in each 
precinct, and then to use a statistical model to attempt to extract infor-
mation only within the bounds. Limiting modelling to the sample space 
is not a novel idea, but it is relatively new to this problem because of the 
difficulties posed by the fact that the bounds vary considerably over the 
observations. However, the variation in the constraints means that they 
can be quite informative for some observations in and of themselves 
and collectively in improving the statistical inferences within the 
bounds. The Appendix gives the specific details of our model.69 
 Much individual-level information is lost in the process of aggrega-
tion, and no method can recover it with certainty in all situations. How 
well this information can be reconstructed depends on how much  
deterministic information is available, and on the existence of external 
information. Determining the causes of Nazi voting is a particularly dif-
ficult application because the deterministic approach is very informative 
in only some precincts, and also because of the size of the table, which 
requires one to estimate a large number of unknowns on the basis of 
relatively few known numbers. (For example, for our tables with 5 rows 
and 6 columns, we observe 5 + 6 = 11 quantities but need to estimate 5 
× 6 = 30 quantities, twenty-four of which are independent. Making this 
inference is obviously impossible without some assumptions.) If a  
researcher had a choice, it would be better to pick an application with 
more deterministic information and smaller tables (reliable individual 
level survey data would even be better!), but the importance of the en-
during question compels us to attempt to draw out every last bit of in-
formation about these incredible events. Because of the difficulty of 
making inferences in this setting, we cannot offer any definitive answers 
to the question of who voted for the Nazis, but because our method com-
bines all sources of information (something no previous analysis has 
done), our procedure has a chance of doing better than earlier analyses. 
 
68 King, Rosen, and Tanner, “Binomial-Beta Hierarchical Models”; Rosen et al., “Bayesian 
and Frequentist Inference”; and Herron and Sekhon, “Black Candidates.” 
69 Software to run this model is available in the R package called Zelig. It can be downloaded 
at http://gking.harvard.edu.  
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But, of course, the nature of this statistical inference is such that one can 




 We begin by creating thirty groups from the cross-classification of 
our five social groups—self-employed, domestic, blue collar, white  
collar, and unemployed—with our six geographic regions—defined by 
low, medium, and high unemployment areas and Protestant and Catho-
lic confessional areas. Figure 2 gives the number of people in each. The 
length of the bar next to each group is proportional to the number of 
people in it. For the presentation, to organize these groups and provide 
some focus to our analysis, we hone in on only the fifteen largest 
groups. Making ecological inferences about the fifteen smaller groups is 
significantly more difficult (because of wider bounds and less statistical 
information) and in part because of this larger uncertainty, we find few 
patterns that significantly distinguish any of the smaller groups from the 
baseline nationwide swings. Fortunately, the groups that are the subject 
of our theoretical arguments are well represented among the fifteen 
largest groups.71 
 Figure 2 also classifies the fifteen largest groups into the Working 
Poor, the Unemployed, and the Blue- and White-Collar Workers. This 
classification organizes our presentation in the rest of this section, but to 
avoid any selection or additional grouping biases, the statistical analyses 
on which these results are based include the full set of all thirty groups, 
representing all of Germany. The two groups most negatively affected 
by the disastrous economic situation include the working poor and the 
unemployed. The remaining groups represent blue- and white-collar 
workers. 
 If our argument above is correct, we should see strong support for the 
Nazis over and above national swings from the working poor groups,  
 
 
70 See Miller and Robins, “Who did Vote for Hitler?” for a discussion of how some of these 
methodological issues have been addressed in existing literature. Early statistical studies in this 
area include Bernstein, “Über eine Methode”; Prais and Aitchison,“Grouping”; and Shivley, 
“Party Identification.” 
71 As a reality check on our methods, we report our estimates of what may be the only uncon-
troversial conclusion about Nazi voting behavior: that Protestants supported the Nazi party 
much more than Catholics. Our method indicates that this was 44 percent (with a 95 percent 
confidence interval ranging from 42 percent to 45 percent) compared to 16 percent (with a 95 
percent confidence interval ranging from 15 percent to 17 percent). As we will see, however, the 
social dimension adds an important additional factor over and above the confessional dimen-
sion. The great precision with which we are able to estimate these vote shares stems from the 
fact that we “only” need to estimate a 5x2 table in this case. 







Note: Each line in the figure is one group created from the cross-classification of five social 
groups —(S)elf-employed, (D)omestic, (B)lue Collar, (W)hite Collar, and (U)nemployed—with 
six geographic groupings—defined by (L)ow, (M)edium, and (H)igh unemployment areas and 
(P)rotestant and (C)atholic confessional areas. (The acronym for each group is created from 
three of the capital letters in parentheses given here. So, for example, the first listed group is 
SHP, which refers to all self-employed people in areas with high unemployment and predomi-
nantly Protestant populations.) 
Source: See the text. 
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whereas most support from the unemployed should go to the Commu-
nists. The divergent voting results from these two groups—both gravely 
hurt by the economic depression—constitute the key test that should 
distinguish our theory from those that have come before. The pattern 
should be present in both Protestant and Catholic areas for the self-
employed, while for the domestic workers and helping family members, 
we expect the powerful incentives the Catholic Church offered on be-
half of the Zentrum party to be at least a counterweight against the Nazi 
appeal. Our explanation also predicts no consistent trend in support for 
the Nazis from the white- and blue-collar workers, which directly con-
tradicts several versions of class theory. Finally, we also expect to find 
the collapse of the right wing parties as well as the liberal parties in part 
traceable to the withdrawal of support from the working poor. 
 We present our main results in six logically parallel figures. The first, 
Figure 3, portrays all six elections that we study: March 1933 (top left), 
November 1932 (top right), July 1932 (middle left), 1930 (middle right), 
1928 (bottom left), and December 1924 (bottom right). The format of 
each is the same, plotting the vote share over and above national level of 
support for a group on the vertical axis by the group size on the horizon-
tal axis. (Note that the vertical axis for the bottom two graphs differs 
from the top two.) To understand how to read the graph, consider the in-
terpretation of, say, the position of the group of self-employed people 
from areas with high unemployment and predominantly Protestants 
(marked SHP) in 1930. The value 0.6 on the vertical axis (at the ap-
proximate center of the SHP line representing a 90 percent confidence in-
terval) means we estimate that 75 percent (0.60 + 0.15 swing or 75 per-
cent) of this group gave its vote to the Nazis, which of course is 60 
percentage points more than proportionate once we account for the 15 
percent swing in 1930. Since the numbers are measured relative to their 
nationwide swing, the same 0.6 in the graph for 1932 would mean that 
the group gave 91 percent (0.6 + 0.31 swing in 1932, or 91 percent) of the 
vote to the Nazis.72 
 Consider now the July 1932 election plot, which presents results for 
each of the top fifteen groups plotted by their size (horizontally, 
denominated in millions, but on the log scale for graphic clarity) by 
how much we estimated that each group voted for the Nazis in the elec-
tion over and above the proportion of votes in the population the Nazis 
received. Each group is represented by a dot, which gives the method’s  
 
 
72 Switching to a 95 percent confidence interval produces no major substantive consequences, 
but it would make the graphs harder to read. 





VOTE FOR THE NAZIS 
 
Note: The vertical axes for 1930, 1932, and 1933 differ from those for 1924 and 1928. All vote 
shares are relative to the national vote proportion given in the title of each graph and the vertical 
bars are 90 percent confidence intervals for the vote shares. Group size on the horizontal axis is 
in millions but plotted on the log scale.  
Sources: See the text for an explanation of the figures and Figure 2 for definitions of the acronyms 
that label the groups in this figure. 
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point estimate of the fraction of the vote for the Nazis over and above 
the national swing, and a 90 percent confidence interval, represented by 
a vertical bar. Consider, for example, blue-collar workers from areas 
that are low in unemployment and predominantly Protestant (marked 
BLP). The dot for this group is nearly on the horizontal dashed line at 
zero (and the confidence interval bar overlaps it), which indicates that it 
gave to the Nazis almost the same fraction as the entire country in this 
election (i.e., 31.1 percent). 
 The July 1932, November 1932, and March 1933 graphs in Figure 3 
strongly support our main argument. In particular, the working poor 
groups in the Protestant precincts all give the Nazis disproportionate 
support, with the self-employed providing exceptionally strong support 
in most Catholic and Protestant precincts: at slightly more than 60 per-
centage points more than the national swing, our model estimates that 
the self-employed (from areas with high unemployment and that are 
predominantly Protestant) give all but a few percent to the Nazis. The 
other domestic workers, who make up the working poor groups, also 
give the Nazis strong disproportionate support, although with more 
variability among themselves. The figures also reveal the disproportion-
ately low support the Nazis received from the unemployed, compared to 
the national swing (as can be seen by the UHP dot appearing below the 
dashed horizontal line). 
 The set of graphs in Figure 3 also reveal the pattern over time by 
which the result in 1933 eventually unfolded. Each of the six graphs 
displays each group’s support relative to the national swing for that 
year. Across the years, the parties taken together are moving quite dra-
matically over the six elections, with an average swing (indicated in the 
graph subtitles) ranging from 2.3 percent in 1924 to 38.7 percent in 
1933. However, many groups stay on the horizontal line, the point equal 
to the national swing, which as we pointed out is consistent with the 
vast majority of other elections in the history of representative democ-
racies. Again, we emphasize that the underlying statistical analysis in all 
figures is based on calculations including all thirty groups. (Most of the 
fifteen smaller groups would also appear on or near the line if we had 
included them in the figures.) 
 The key divergent pattern in these figures—the main pattern that 
makes the Weimar elections different from others—is the decline in 
support for the Nazi party among the unemployed and the rise in sup-
port among the working poor. Although hints of both can be seen even 
in 1924, the change across the six graphs is dramatic, relative to other 
elections and other parties within these elections. Other groups in the 
Protestant precincts, in particular the blue-collar workers (BLP, BMP, 
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and BHP) and the white collar workers (WLP, WMP, and WHP) did not 
vote more than proportionately for the Nazis, indicating that the  
religious affiliation of a precinct alone did not explain the vote. 
 Conversely, the working poor’s vote is also, in some cases, moder-
ated or caused by incentives relevant only in Catholic areas. That is, our 
analysis also provides strong support for the idea that the Zentrum 
wielded substantial economic local and regional power through its links 
with the Catholic Church. Of the six working poor groups in the Protes-
tant areas (SHP, SMP, and SLP; DHP, DMP, and DLP), none voted less 
than proportionately for the Nazis. By contrast, domestic workers in low 
and medium unemployment areas in Catholic precincts (DLC and 
DMC) voted less for the Nazis than the national swing. We regard this 
as consistent with the theory developed above. The self-employed voted 
for the Nazis to a disproportionate extent even in Catholic precincts. 
The one surprising result we obtain is that self-employed in Catholic 
and high unemployment precincts voted very strongly for the SPD and 
the Zentrum. We have not been able to determine with any certainty 
why this occurs. It may be disconfirming evidence of our theory or per-
haps instead is due to limitations of our methodology for estimating the 
large number of parameters required in small samples. We highlight this 
result as a limitation to our analysis and call for the collection of other 
types of data to try to ascertain its causes.  
 By definition, when the Nazis receive additional support, some other 
party must lose support. We now try to sort out which party lost votes 
among each population group.73 The Far Right lost 15 percent of the 
vote over the six elections, and the Liberals lost 10 percent. Figures 4 
and 5 show how these results arose. In 1924 the far right DNVP (which 
was in the government in the early part of the period we study) received 
highly disproportionate support from the three domestic groups among 
the working poor. Interestingly, even though the DNVP was not in the 
government in the grand coalition (1928–1930) and even became  
resolutely oppositional later on, the party continued to be identified with 
big agriculture.74 Consequently, by July 1932, support from the domes-
tic groups for the Far Right had collapsed, well beyond what happened 
to the party nationally. (Again, note that the movement of the domestic 
groups relative to the nationwide swing implies that they moved from 
45 percent support for the Far Right to only 5 percent.)  
 
 
73 We believe this feature to be unique to our analysis. For example, the account in Brustein, 
Logic, is based only on NSDAP membership and therefore needs to take as given results for 
other parties that other scholars may have derived. 
74 Childers, Nazi Voter, p. 218. 





VOTE FOR THE DNVP 
 
Sources: See the text and Figure 3 for an explanation of the figures and Figure 2 for definitions 
of the acronyms that label the groups in this figure. 





VOTE FOR THE LIBERAL PARTIES 
 
Sources: See the text and Figure 3 for an explanation of the figures and Figure 2 for definitions 
of the acronyms that label the groups in this figure. 




 While the Nazis attracted part of the working poor from the DNVP, 
namely, the domestic group, the other part, the self-employed, switched 
to the Nazis from the Liberals. We present these results in Figure 5. The 
economic stature of the Selbständige diminished already in the mid-
1920s, and with the onset of the Great Depression, the position of small 
businessmen deteriorated rapidly. Consequently, Figure 5 is quite simi-
lar to the pictures for the Far Right, with the difference that here it is the 
self-employed who started as core supporters of the Liberals, and 
switched to the Nazis over time. 
 We present the results for the Communist Party, and the other small 
parties on the Far Left, in Figure 6. Most of the results here are also 
consistent with our argument. The July 1932 election witnessed a swing 
to the Far Left of 5 percentage points (from 1924). Most of the pickup 
was from blue-collar workers (most of who were at serious risk of  
unemployment) and the unemployed. It was especially the unemployed 
in Catholic precincts who voted for the Communists, while the  
unemployed in Protestant precincts found a feasible alternative in the 
SPD. 
 Figure 7 is a graph of the support of groups for the Left and Center. 
Overall, recall that the SPD and Zentrum only lost about 3 percentage 
points between 1924 and 1933, but we can still see some clear patterns. 
Consistent with the notion that the Catholic Church was successful in 
mobilizing voters to remain loyal to the Zentrum, while the SPD had no 
similarly powerful protectorate in the Protestant precincts, our results 
indicate that the only working poor group voting more than  
proportionately for the Left and Center was a Catholic group. All other 
groups are on or below the horizontal line in Figure 7. The Protestant 
self-employed (marked SLP, SMP, and SHP) never supported the  
governing parties. The unemployed exhibited an interesting pattern: In 
the Protestant precincts, where the SPD was relatively stronger than the 
Zentrum, the unemployed voted also for the SPD, not only for the 
Communists. Over the years, the Social Democrats and the Zentrum 
also lost many blue-collar workers. Importantly, the working poor 
groups in Figure 7 did not change their support for the government  
disproportionately (or only, in the case of the domestic employees in 
Catholic low unemployment precincts, in favor of the Zentrum, which is 
consistent with our theory). 
 Finally, as a check on our results and to provide an alternative view 
of the problem, we switch from ecological inference about social groups 
to voter transitions among the parties in successive elections. We  





VOTE FOR THE COMMUNISTS 
 
Sources: See the text and Figure 3 for an explanation of the figures and Figure 2 for definitions 
of the acronyms that label the groups in this figure. 





VOTE FOR THE SPD, ZENTRUM, AND BVP (LEFT AND CENTER) 
 
Sources: See the text and Figure 3 for an explanation of the figures and Figure 2 for definitions 
of the acronyms that label the groups in this figure. 








July 1932 vote Nazis Left/Center Communists Far Right Liberals 
No Vote/ 
Other 
Low unemployment      
Nazis  0.97* 0.04 0.04  0.34*  0.84*  0.15* 
Left/Center 0.01  0.92* 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09 
Communists 0.01 0.01  0.75* 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Far right 0.01 0.01 0.05  0.45* 0.03 0.03 
Liberals 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04  0.03* 0.02 
No vote/other 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.05  0.66* 
Medium unemployment      
Nazis  0.91* 0.01 0.04  0.59*  0.68*  0.17* 
Left/Center 0.02  0.95* 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Communists 0.01 0.01  0.71* 0.05 0.05 0.11 
Far right 0.02 0.01 0.06  0.20* 0.06 0.05 
Liberals 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 
No vote/other 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09  0.58* 
High unemployment      
Nazis  0.72* 0.02 0.06  0.62*  0.37*  0.20* 
Left/Center 0.06  0.90* 0.03 0.06  0.19*  0.16* 
Communists 0.06 0.02  0.79* 0.06  0.15* 0.09 
Far right 0.05 0.01 0.03  0.12* 0.08 0.07 
Liberals 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 
No vote/other 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.10  0.14*  0.46* 
* indicates items that are larger than 0.11. 
Notes: Each cell gives the estimated probability from moving a particular vote in 1930 to a vote 
in July 1932. The probabilities are estimated for each of our six regions, which were based on 
confession and unemployment labels.  
Source: See the text. Note entries larger than 0.11 are in italics to highlight patterns. 
 
summarize the results for one transition in Tables 3A and 3B, which es-
timate the fraction of support each party in 1930 gives to each of the 
parties in July 1932. We present these results for each of the six regions 
separately. Voter loyalty figures can be read off the diagonal in these 
tables. Voter loyalty is estimated to be high for most parties, but  
particularly low for the Far Right and especially high for the Nazis. Off-
diagonal elements in these tables reflect different types of defection 
from parties (or the category of nonvoters and other small parties). 
 








July 1932 vote Nazis Left/Center Communists Far Right Liberals 
No Vote/ 
Other 
Low unemployment      
Nazis  0.98* 0.04 0.01  0.34*  0.26*  0.49* 
Left/Center 0.00  0.86* 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.02 
Communists 0.00 0.02  0.86* 0.05 0.10 0.02 
Far right 0.00 0.02 0.03  0.44*  0.13* 0.05 
Liberals 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02  0.12* 0.02 
No vote/other 0.01 0.05 0.05  0.12*  0.30*  0.41* 
Medium unemployment      
Nazis  0.96*  0.16* 0.02  0.17*  0.13*  0.51* 
Left/Center 0.01  0.77* 0.03 0.10  0.26* 0.05 
Communists 0.01 0.02  0.84* 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Far right 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.50*  0.16* 0.03 
Liberals 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.14* 0.02 
No vote/other 0.02 0.04 0.06  0.15*  0.25*  0.35* 
High unemployment      
Nazis  0.95* 0.10 0.02  0.15*  0.22*  0.50* 
Left/Center 0.01  0.84* 0.03 0.08  0.16* 0.02 
Communists 0.01 0.01  0.87* 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Far right 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.51* 0.11 0.04 
Liberals 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05  0.13* 0.03 
No vote/other 0.02 0.04 0.05  0.15*  0.32*  0.35* 
* indicates items that are larger than 0.11. 
Note: See the notes for Table 3A.  
Source: See the source for Table 3A. 
 
 For visual clarity, we have highlighted all numbers greater than 0.11. 
We omit the standard errors to prevent complicated tables from becom-
ing even more complicated, but almost all of these highlighted numbers 
are at least twice their standard errors and so can be reliably distin-
guished from zero; almost all others cannot. (This and graphical clarity 
is how we chose this particular cutoff point.) Thus, for example, we can 
see where the Nazis in July 1932 received their main support by looking 
at the italicized entries in the Nazi rows. In addition to holding on to 
their previous supporters, the Nazis received substantial additional  
support from previous Far Right supporters. In addition, as a significant 
fraction of the Nazi support starting in 1930 appear to have from previous 
nonvoters. Another pattern in the tables is that many Far Right supporters 
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in 1930 sat out the July 1932 election. The tables partially confirm the 
political confessionalism hypothesis of Burnham as developed by Falter, 
but not equally strongly on all counts.75 For example, the Communists 
may have gained some votes from the Liberals and the Far Right.  
 We also analyze (but do not present) voter transitions in the other 
elections. For the November 1932 vote, we find that the Nazis mostly 
lost their votes to nonvoters; by contrast, the SPD and Zentrum were 
able to keep a larger fraction of voters loyal to them between July and 
November. In March 1933 a quarter of former DNVP voters defected to 
the Nazis, as did more than 10 percent of Communists in Catholic pre-
cincts. Almost all November 1932 Nazi voters again voted for the Na-
zis, whereas the SPD and Zentrum achieved voter loyalty of less than 
90 percent, losing voters to the Nazis especially in both Catholic and 




 In process, but obviously not outcome, the dynamics of the Weimar 
Republic’s electoral swing between 1924 and 1933 to Hitler and the 
Nazi Party parallel that of almost every other swing in the history of 
democratic elections. The national swing to the Nazis fits a standard  
retrospective voting explanation, explaining a retreat from the  
established parties and a shift to ever more extreme opposition parties 
resulting from the disastrous economic conditions (in addition to  
ideological shifts towards nationalism and anti-Semitism). Our results 
indicate that the majority of social groups swung in the same direction 
and approximately the same amount. In addition, just like other elec-
tions, the support each group gave to the Nazis in 1924 did not predict 
how far a group would move in the next election. But importantly, we 
were also able to identify the groups that moved disproportionately and 
distinctively compared to the national swing baseline, thus invalidating 
the notion that the Nazis were a catchall party. 
 Of the two groups most hurt by the economic depression, we find that 
the working poor—self-employed shopkeepers and professionals,  
domestic workers, and helping family members—were the main group 
that wound up moving to support the Nazis. In Catholic precincts,  
domestic workers remained loyal to the SPD and especially the Zen-
trum, consistent with the multifaceted incentives encouraging them to 
do so—in particular, Nazi policies on agriculture unattractive for people 
living in the South and the West, welfare programs embedded in a  
 
75 Burnham, “Political Immunisation”; and Falter, Hitlers Wähler. 
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network of social and political organizations with close ties to the Zen-
trum, and the power of incentives emanating from the Catholic Church. 
The other group fatally hurt was the unemployed, which wound up sup-
porting the Communists (though some Protestant unemployed voted for 
the SPD). This finding is consistent with current understandings of the 
incentives of these voters. Further hypotheses on economic voting can, 
of course, be developed and tested. For example, one interesting future 
research question is whether the population of export-dependent areas 
voted less (controlling for religious affiliation) for the Nazis (who 
strongly embraced autarky) than did the population of areas with fewer 
exports. 
 Our results become especially clear when we look at the election 
through the eyes of the economic voting behavior literature. In particu-
lar, we remove the patterns that occur in every country and look primar-
ily at the disproportionate support individual groups provide over and 
above the nationwide swing to the Nazi party. It may still be hard to 
fathom how democratic elections led to such a horrific outcome but, 
when looked at in a comparative perspective, the process by which this 
outcome occurred becomes amenable to relatively standard political 
science explanations. Methodologically, whereas few works in the  
existing literature have used any statistical method invented in the last 
fifty years, this article adapts a method of ecological inference designed 
especially for this problem. Unlike existing approaches used in this  
literature, this approach uses all available deterministic information and 
existing statistical information together in the same model. Because it 
uses more information, the results should be more reliable. Of course, 
considerable information is lost in making ecological inferences to 5 × 6 
tables, and nothing we can do now will resurrect this information with 
certainty. Certainly public opinion polls of survivors would not yield 
any useful information, and no other source of election data exists. As 
such, any method of ecological inference applied to this problem will 
produce results with many uncertainties, which of course leaves much 
work for future generations of scholars to pursue, and much we will 
never know.  
 Finally, some may find it satisfying from a scientific perspective that 
we are apparently able to demonstrate that the elections that put Adolf 
Hitler in power are subject to the same ordinary voting behavior expla-
nations as are most other democratic elections worldwide. However, it 
seems worth asking about the implications of this result for avoiding a 
similarly horrible and extreme outcome in a modern democracy. For 
decades following World War II, the main lesson philosophers, commen-
tators, and social scientists took from these elections was that democracy 
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should be limited in some way so that the impressionable masses might 
be protected from demagogues. In recent years, dominant opinion 
seems to have switched back to preferring democracy and freedom to be 
maximized. In contrast, the empirical results offered here may suggest 
that focus should be on the output, not the input. That is, if we are  
interested in the likely reactions of voters and parties, we may want to 
focus more on governmental successes and failures in choosing and  
implementing public policies than on the degree of intellectual versus 
demagogic appeals of the candidates. 
 
Appendix: Penalized Nonlinear Least-Squares  
Estimation 
 
 Appendix Table 4 introduces the notation required for describing the technical de-
tails of our methodology.  
 For precinct (Kreis) i (i = 1,…,p), we observe the fractions of voting-age people 
who turn out to vote for specific parties ( iT1 ,…, CiT ) and the fractions of voting-age 
people in different social classes ( iX1 ,…, RiX ). The unobserved quantities (
i
rcβ , r = 
1,…,R, c = 1,…,C–1) are the fractions of people in social class r, who vote for party c.  




Ciiii TTTT =  be the numbers of voting-age people who turn out to vote 
for the different parties. We assume that 'iT  follows a multinomial distribution with 
parameter vector ( )TCiii θθθθ ,...,, 211 =  and count iN  where ciθ  
equals∑ =Rr riirc X1 β for c = 1,..,.C, under the constraint that ∑ = =Cc ci1 1θ . We  













for r = 1,…,R, c = 1,…,C-1 and i = 1,…,p. 
 For each table i = 1,…,p, define iNciTciT /
'= , for c = 1,…,C, and 
{ } CRcrirci , 1,1, == ββ  (subject to ∑ = =Cc irc1 1β  for each r). Define also 
( ) CRcrrc , 1,1, == γγ  (with the constraint )0=rCγ . It follows that iiT β'  is multinomial 
( ){ }CciciTEiN 1; =β  where 
( ) ( )∑= ∑=≡= Rr Rr irciNriXircriXiciTE 1 1 /' βββ  
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APPENDIX TABLE 4 
NOTATION FOR THE iTH R X C TABLE 
 Voting Decision  
Social class Party 1 Party 2 … Party c … Party C Sum 
SC 1 i
11β  i12β  … ic1β  … ∑ =− Cc
i
c1 11 β  iX1  
SC 2 i
21β  i22β  … i c2β  … ∑ =− Cc i c1 21 β  iX 2  
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
SC r i
r1β  ir2β  … ircβ  … ∑ =− Cc irc11 β  riX  
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
SC R i
R1β  iR2β  … iRcβ  … ∑ =− Cc iRc11 β  ∑ =− Rr riX11  
Sum 
iT1  iT2  
 
ciT  
 ∑ =− Cc ciT11   
Note: See the text and the Appendix for an explanation. 
Source: See the text. 
 
It is easily shown that 
( ) ( ) ( )∑=== Rr ircEriXciTEicm 1 γβγγ  
for c = 1,…,C–1 and i = 1,…,p. The ( )γicm ’s (c=1,…,C–1) are mean functions, and ( )γβ ircE  is given in (1).  
 
 The penalized nonlinear least-squares approach consists of solving  
 
( )( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ∑= ∑−= ∑= ∑−=+−pi Cc Rr Cc rcicmciT1 11 1 11 22min γλγγ  (2) 
 
to obtain the estimate of γ . The second term is a penalty where λ  is a fixed constant. 
The minimization (2) is solved numerically. To obtain standard errors of the parameter 
estimates, we use bootstrapping, based on B (typically 200) sets of p tables. These sets 
are obtained by sampling with replacement B pairs ( )iTiX ,  from the observed data, 




 76 For details, we refer the reader to King, Rosen, and Tanner, “Binomial-Beta Hierarchical 
Models”; and Rosen et al., “Bayesian and Frequentist Inference.” 
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